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BALANCED AND UNBALANCED GROWTH
ABSTRACT
A mechanism of endogenous growth suitable for investigation of sectoral or regional
interaction is developed. It is shown how the high value placed on production linkages by
economic historians might be reconciled with the high value placed on openness (often implying
lack of linkages) by observers of contemporary less developed countries. When the output of one
sector is traded andthe outputof the other is nontraded, it is shown how the traded goods sector
acts as the "engine of growth" in the sense that its profitability of knowledge acquisition
primarily determines the steady state aggregate growth rate. It is also shown how sectors or
regions interact out of steady state through product, labor, and capital markets, and in particular
how if the former interaction dominates the growth of one sector "pulls along' the growth of the
other while if the latter two interactions dominate one sector or region booms while the other
declines. The paper builds on these results to show why liberalization of foreign trade should
lead to a transition from a lower to a higher steady state growth rate and why, during the course
of this transition, growth might initially be even slower than before liberalization, On this basis
a reinterpretation of the post-1973 economic performance of Chile is offered. A final application
to economic integration of previously separate regions or countries shows that the largest growth
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Thispaper addresses several related issues. How does growth in one region or sector of a
country stimulate growth in another sector or region? This phenomenon is known in the
economic development literature as linkage. If the linkage is severed, what happens to the
sector or region that served as the "engine of growth," and what happens to the sector or
region that was being pulled along? How does this sectoral interaction work to determine
the country's aggregate growth rate?
In the model I propose there are two sectors, which can in specific historical
circumstances correspond to two regions. Sector T is a traded goods sector and sector N is
a nontraded goods sector. Goods may be nontraded because of transportation costs (e.g.,
services, perishable agricultural products, poor internal transport to interior regions) or
because of government policy (high barriers to international trade).1 The country is
assumed to be small relative to the world economy so that the price of traded goods is fixed
in international markets. Growth occurs by accumulation of knowledge. Like most small
countries (and many large, poor ones) this country does not do any research and
development, acquiring all of its new knowledge from abroad instead. I suppose that the
country is sufficiently "backward" that we can treat the supply of this new knowledge as
inexhaustible.
I suppose that knowledge acquired in one sector is not directly useful in the other.
For this reason there is no cause to believe a priori that both sectors will grow at the same
rate, i. e., that growth will be "balanced". Sectoral growth rates are nevertheless linked
through product, labor, and capital markets. Growth of sector T generates demand forthe
output of sector N by increasing consumer income (a "consumption linkage").2 Suppose
then that sector T is initially growing faster than sector N, causing the relative price of
'\Vhen nontradeability is due to transportation costs it might be reasonable to think of the
area covered by the two sectors of the model as smaller than that of the entire country.In
the concluding section of this paper I discuss how my model could be more formally related
to the regional economics literature.
2In Rauch (1992) I also cover the case where sector N output is used as an input by sectorT
(a "production linkage").nontraded goods to increase. Since both sectors draw on a common pool of labor, this
movement of the terms of trade in favor of sector N will raise the real wage for sector T
and thus reduce the incentive to invest in more knowledge, slowing growth there, while
having the opposite effect in sector N. In short, some (perhaps unique) terms of trade will
exist that balances growth between the two sectors, and associated with these terms of
trade will be a (perhaps unique) steady state rate of growth.3
Most empirical studies of this kind of sectoral growth interaction identify the two
sectors as agriculture and industry, either of which may play the "leading" role depending
on the specific historical situation. The interaction between agriculture and industry is an
attractive subject for empirical research for at least two reasons: it is a key to almost any
country's economic development (or lack of it), and the division into industry and
agriculture is the most commonly available disaggregation of output series. Perhaps the
most thoroughly studied example of agro-industrial growth linkages is the development of
the Punjab region of India and Pakistan that has taken place since the introduction of
"green revolution" technology there in the 1960s. Drawing on the empirical work of Child
and Kaneda (1975) and Chadha (1986), Stewart and Ghani (1991) state that in the Indian
Punjab
In the early stages, much of the industrial growth was due to pecuniary
externalities--i.e., improved markets for industrial products arising from
linkages with agriculture. ...The strong linkages present can be seen in the
geographical spread of industries which closely corresponds to the
agricultural development of the state (p. 583).
Stewart and Ghani also note the presence of "informational externalities" within the
agricultural and industrial sectors. In agriculture
3Note that the balanced growth steady state is actually the end product of an out of steady
state adjustment process that Hirschman (1958) would call "unbalanced growth". I reserve
the term "unbalanced growth" for the situation, discussed below, where growth in one
sector or region reduces rather than stimulates growth in the other sector or region.3
The new technology requires a specific combination of inputs which depend
on soil conditions. An individual farmer wanting to adopt the new
technology would have to incur the cost of acquiring information on input
requirements. The farmer is not in a position fully to appropriate the
benefits, however, since neighboring farmers, with similar soil conditions,
may observe the input mix (p. 582).
In industry
Technologies were rapidly diffused by copying, sometimes aided by the
transfer of labor from one firm to another (p. 585).
These within-sector knowledge spillovers will be incorporated into the growth mechanism I
develop in section 1 below.
Less direct evidence for the interaction between agricultural and industrial growth
that I describe is abundantly available. A strong association between agricultural growth
and the growth of manufacturing establishments by region was found for the Philippines by
Anderson and Khambata (1981). Tang (1958) and Nicholls (1969) present evidence that
nearby industrial-urban development induced technological change in agriculture in the
Southern Piedmont region of the United States and in Brazil, respectively. Using
cross-national data, Nishimizu and Page (1988) find a strong partial correlation between
total factor productivity growth in industry and agricultural growth during the period
1960-1980. Finally, evidence suggesting that the terms of trade mechanism described
above is at work in India is contained in Ahiuwalia and Rangarajan (1988, pp. 234-236),
who find that the terms of trade for agriculture positively influence agricultural investment
and negatively influence industrial investment.
Now suppose that the output of sector N is traded, so that the intersectoral terms of
trade are determined on international markets rather than by the need to equate domestic
supply and demand. Without the terms of trade adjustment mechanism, more rapid
growth in one sector will merely serve to raise wages and lower profitability in theother
sector, inducing a cumulative decline in the slower-growing sector. I call thissituation
"unbalanced growth". We see that the presence of a labor market that is integrated across
sectors or regions is crucial to the existence of unbalanced growth, as opposed to growth
along different steady state paths as might occur among different countries.Good4
historical examples are the deindustrializations that occurred in Burma, Philippines, and
Thailand with the increase in specialization in rice production for export during the period
1870-1938, as documented by Resnick (1970).4Unbalancedgrowth would also seem to be
a good description of the decades-long declines of the Northeast region of Brazil relative to
the South and the South of Italy relative to the North. The population share of the
Brazilian Northeast declined monotonically from 46.7 percent in 1872 to 29 percent in
1980, with net emigration being reported in every ten- or twenty-year period for which
data is available (Baer 1989, pp. 317, 326). The Italian case will be discussed in some
detail in section 4 below. Determination of the aggregate growth rate of an economy along
an unbalanced growth path is discussed in section 3.
In the theoretical literature several papers stand out most clearly as antecedents for
the present work. In Ranis and Fei (1961), adjustment in the intersectoral terms of trade
leads to balanced growth in the same manner as in this paper. In their classical model
endogenous growth is possible because labor is in unlimited supply, allowing capital to be
accumulated without encountering diminishing returns. They do not, however, consider
the case of fixed terms of trade and unbalanced growth. The two-country model of
Grossman and Helpman (1990) has some important formal similarities to the unbalanced
growth model in this paper. Their assumption that knowledge that accumulates in one
country does not spill over to the other country parallels my assumption that knowledge
acquired in one sector does not benefit the other sector. There are three steady states in
their model, two where only the country that had a "head start" acquiresknowledge while
the other specializes in "traditional" production, and one unstableone where both countries
acquire knowledge. Similarly, there are three steady states in my unbalanced growth
model: two where the country specializes in the sector that had a "headstart", and one
41n Thailand deindustrialization progressed least in the mostgeographically remote areas, as
we would expect from the above discussion. In the Philippines substantial new industry
arose through "forward linkages" to agro-processing, and something similar appears to
have happened in the Chilean case disccussed in section 3 below (see especiallyFigure 9).5
unstable balanced growth steady state. However, Grossman and Helpman are not
concerned with explaining the same phenomena as is this paper. They have no model
comparable to my balanced growth model, and their two countries do notshare a common
labor market as do my two sectors. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) develop a model
where an agricultural "leading sector" stimulates nontraded industrial production, but
their analysis is comparative static and their chief concern is with the interactionof income
distribution and the size of the domestic market for industry. Finally, Matsuyama (1991)
allows agricultural productivity to either stimulate or retard industrial growth, depending
on whether the economy is closed or open to international trade. Knowledgeis
accumulated in industry through learning-by-doing rather than by the decisions of
profit-seeking firms, however, and there is no endogenous accumulation of knowledgein
agriculture, ruling out balanced growth as defined above.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the first section I formally
develop the mechanism of exponential growth on which all of the following analysisis
based. Readers less interested in derivations can skim this rather long section.The next
section completes the core model by embedding this mechanism in a two sector framework,
and derives some results on steady state growth rates. The stability of the balanced
growth path is also discussed. Section 3 analyzes what happenswhen an economy moves
from balanced to unbalanced growth as a result of trade liberalization, and arguesthat the
unbalanced growth model is useful for understanding the post-1973 economic performance
of Chile. Section 4 uses the unbalanced growth model to analyze the effects ofeconomic
integration of separate regions or countries into one country. In the concludingsection I
summarize the results of the paper and explore the possibilities for extensions of themodels
presented.
1. The mechanism of growth
As stated in the introduction above, this paper intends to explore phenomena6
generated by the interaction of growth in different sectors of the economy. Its purpose is
not to postulate a new mechani.sm for "endogenous growth". In section 1.1, therefore, I
take what I believe is the most appropriate "off-the-shelf' mechanism as far as it can go in
explaining the phenomena of interest. Unfortunately this turns out to be not far enough,
and a "new"mechanismmust be developed in the following subsection that adds both
descriptive realism and explanatory power but loses some transparency. Indeed, it is this
loss that makes explicit presentation of the results obtained using the off-the-shelf
mechanism worthwhile.
1.1 A candidate mechanism
The candidate mechanism of growth is a discrete time version of what Romer (1989)
in his survey of the endogenous growth literature calls the Krugman-Lucas model. This
model has two special features that make it attractive for present purposes: the knowledge
accumulated by each sector is specific to it, allowing the sectors potentially to grow at
different rates, and the supply of knowledge to each sector is inexhaustible, suiting our
assumption of relative backwardness. Specifically, knowledge accumulation in each sector
takes place entirely through learning by doing according to the equation
K1.1 =K+ KjtJ4, (1.1.1)
where K is human capital (knowledge) specialized to the production of good jattime t, p3
is a constant "learning coefficient" for sector j,and4isthe fraction of the labor force
devoted to producing output of sector jattime t.5 Specialized knowledge in turn feeds
into Ricardian production functions for each sector:
=K4L, (1.1.2)
where Q{isoutput of sector jattime t and tisthe inelasticaily supplied labor endowment
of the economy. It is immediately clear that, given a steady state value of V, a steady
5lmplicitly equation (1.1.1) assumes costless diffusion of knowledge amon perfectly
competitive firms within a sector so that no individual firm has an incentwe to increase its
employment in order to capture more technological progress.7
state growth rate p]!3 of sector joutputper worker is determined.
Lucas (1988) supposes, as does the present paper, that there exist two sectors, the
outputs of which are imperfect substitutes in consumption. He specifies the preferencesof
the representative consumer by the function
U(c',c2) =[(lO)(c')' + O(c2Y']'/",p< 1, (1.1.3)
where c is individual consumption of the output of sector jandtime subscripts have been
omitted since the consumer has no intertemporal decisions to make. This utility function
yields a constant elasticity in consumption equal to c =1/(1-p)￿ 0. Given a wage w we
can find aggregate demand functions
C' ={(l)(10)E/[(pl)_E(lQ)E +
C2 ={(p2)(O)E/[(pl)(1_O) + (p2)l(O)E]}wL, (1.1.4)
where C is aggregate consumption and pi is the price of output of sector j.
Consideran autarkic economy (one where the output of both sectors is nontraded).
In such an economy C' =Qi,and if we add the assumption of pure competition we also
have p. =w/KJ.Clearly relative prices move inversely to physical productivity. We can
then ask, if the physical productivity of one sector is initially growing faster, will the
induced change in relative prices be sufficient to "pull along" the lagging sector? We can
find the answer as follows. Noting that the derived demands for labor are given by




If< 1, the rising relative price of the lagging sector causes its share of the laborforce to
increase, increasing its rate of physical productivity growth relative to theother sector. If
f> 1, the opposite happens. It seems reasonable to assume that the elasticityof
substitution in consumption between agricultural and manufacturing output is low,in
which case this model can explain the kind of sectoral growth interaction describedin the8
introduction to this paper.
We can substitute equation (1.1.1) and pi =w/KJinto equation (1.1.5) and
rearrange slightly to get
=(j/,2)[(1_O)/O(K/K)&l. (1.1.6)
We see that there is a unique steady state knowledge stock ratio K'/K2 given by
{(1/2)[(1_9)/7]f}h/(1) (which is also the autarky price ratio p2/p') and that for <1
the steady state is globally stable. We also have p'L' =ji212in the steady state, which can
be used in combination with the the full employment condition £1 + 12= 1to obtain 1' =
p/(p'+ p2). The steady state autarky growth rate of GDP per worker is then
gA =p1l=p1p2/(1+ p2). (1.1.7)
Now suppose that the reason the output of our autarkic economy is nontraded is
government barriers to international trade. If these barriers are removed our country faces
a price ratio determined in world markets that I assume it is too small to influence. This
opening causes the country to immediately specialize completely in one of the two sectors
(unless the world price ratio is the same as our country's autarky price ratio), yielding a
new steady state growth rate of GDP per worker equal to either p' or p2 that is necessarily
higher than gA This result is consistent with the cross—sectional empirical evidence
relating openness to per capita GDP growth in LDCs (see Edwards 1992 for a survey).
What are the defects of this candidate mechanism for our purposes? First, we
would like to be able to identify one sector as the "engine of growth". But in the above
model, the sectors are symmetric in determining the steady state growth rate. Second, we
would like insight into the sustained sectoral booms and declines that can follow the
opening of national economies to international trade and into the growth of aggregate GDP
during these long transitions. In the above model, however, there are no transition
dynamics for the move from a closed to an open economy. Third, we would like to model
the engine of growth and transition dynamics while retaining the responsiveness of the
steady state growth rate to savings parameters or policies such as capital income taxation9
that is the hallmark of endogenous growth models. This is not possible if we use the
candidate mechanism of growth.
1.2 Addition of a more realistic process of knowledge acquisition
In their study of the process of technological change, Pack and Westphal (1986) do
not find that a backward country's firms acquire new knowledge as a costless by-product of
production (the pure learning-by-doing model). Rather, they find that since this
knowledge is foreign the country's firms must incur some direct cost to assimilate and
adapt it. Because firms would be willing to incur this cost only if they expect to thereby
increase future profits, incorporation of these findings into a mechanism of growth sets up
the Schumpeterian tradeoff of allocative efficiency versus entrepreneurial rents that
characterizes many endogenous growth models, for example those of Grossman and
Helpman (1991).
Given the complexity relative to the candidate mechanism of growth that is added
by this more realistic process of knowledge acquisition, it will be easiest to understand the
mechanism of growth in my model if we begin by limiting our attention to the case where
there is only one active sector. Output of this numeraire good is not storable and is traded
freely on international markets. Production is carried out by identical price-taking firms,
each managed by an identical entrepreneur. In any period the states of the entrepreneur's
knowledge K and the average level of knowledge in the industry i are given. The
entrepreneur is also assumed to supply her entire time endowment E inelastically to
production in every period. Technology displays constant returns to scale in
entrepreneurial time, laborer time L, and intermediate goods M (assumed to be imported
at a price determined in world markets):
Q= Q[H(J,K)F(E,L),M], (1.2.1)
where the scalar Qdenotesoutput and the functions Q,H,and F are all standard CRS
neoclassical production functions. The H function reflects the benefits of knowledge
spillovers within an industry. As in Romer (1987), H is assumed to be linear homogeneous10
in order to allow the model to generate a constant (steady-state) growth rate. Time
subscripts are omitted for now. In any period the entrepreneur wishes to maximize her
profits (rents to her time), which are given by Q- wL-pM,where w is the wage paid to
hire labor and p is the price of the intermediate good. This maximization yields the profit
function fl(H,w,p), where the constant argument E has been suppressed to save notation.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be endowed with special talents not present in (or obtainable
by) the labor force so their profits cannot be bid down by entry of new entrepreneur-firms.
(On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that if 11 fails below w there will be exit.) In
any period, the wage is determined by the need to clear the labor market:
I-Is = (1.2.2)
where L is the inelastically supplied labor endowment of the economy, fl denotes the
derivative of [I with respect to the wage rate, and '1 is the number of entrepreneurs. For
simplicity I assume that population is stationary in the discussion below so that t and i
areconstants.
Now I introduce time into the model, which is measured in discrete periods. I
assume that all agents have access to a perfect capital market for consumption and
investment loans and that each agent is too small to affect the interest rate. The Fisher
separation theorem then tells us we can consider the entrepreneui's intertemporal
consumption and investment decisions separately. I suppose that entrepreneurs and
workers all have the same constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility
functions:
The H function used in Romer (1987) is Cobb-Douglas with exponents that sum to one.
He defines i as total knowledge rather than knowledge per entrepreneur. The latter
formulation is more convenient here since with all entrepreneurs identical we will have
K =IC.In this paper the only substantive effect of assuming that spillovers are a function
of average rather than total knowledge is that a pure increase in scale of theeconomy (e.g.,
doubling the number of entrepreneurs and workers) has no effect on its equilibrium through
the channel of spillovers.11
cr/(1a), o>0,0 < 5<1,
t0<t<cv
wherec is an agent's consumption of the numeraire good, 5givesthe rate of time
discounting, and 1/c gives the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Maximization of
this utility function over sequences {cj subject to the agent's intertemporal budget
constraint yields the standard first-order condition
(c1+Jcj =5(1+
where r is the interest rate. Clearly we can aggregate this first-order condition over all
agents without regard to distribution of wealth, so we can write
(Ct.jCt)c =5(1+ r,1), (1.2.3)
where C is aggregate consumption. The interest rate is determined by the need to equate
desired domestic savings with desired domestic investment, i.e., our country does not
engage in international borrowing or lending.
The entrepreneur's optimal investment policy is to maximize the value of her
wealth, i.e., to maximize the present value of her firm. This value is given by the
discounted sum of the firm's net cash flows. I assume that the entrepreneur can treat the
amount of knowledge she purchases from abroad as a continuous variable. The cost of
acquiring knowledge from abroad includes a licensing fee proportional to the amount of
knowledge purchased plus convex training costs analogous to the convex adjustment costs
assumed in the standard neoclassical model of investment. This formulation is an attempt
to incorporate the findings of Pack and Westphal (1986) that the effort of firms to
assimilate and adapt foreign technology "takes the form of investments in technological
capability, which is the ability to make effective use of technological knowledge" (p. 105),
and that "For standard products, purchasing a license and technical help from the owner of
proprietary knowledge is likely to be the least cost short—run decision" (p. 121). I specify
the entrepreneur's net cash flow in period t as
NCF =fl(H,w,p)
—— (fi/f()(I)2 (1.2.4)12
where can be thought of as a licensing fee paid for knowledge acquired, /3/K can be
thought of as training costs per unit of time, and I =K,1-K>0is investment in
knowledge. Following Teece (1976),7 I justify my specification of training costs as
decreasing in K by learning by doing on the part of trainers: the cost of training
entrepreneurs from a particular country declines with past experience in training as
measured by the number of entrepreneurs from that country trained times the total
amount of knowledge transferred.8 For simplicity it is assumed that variables determined
abroad and thus exogenously to the economy I am studying do not vary with time. The
value of the entrepreneur's firm is then given by
[ JJ (1+ r)'NCF] (1.2.5)
t0<t(rD t0<e<t
The entrepreneur wants to maximize the value of her firm (1.2.5) with respect to
the sequence {I} subject to the equation of motion K+1 =K+ 1L To solve this problem
we form the Ilamiltonian
=jJ (1+ rJ[NCF + (1 + r.1)),1(K + l)J,
where (1 + r,1)1\.1 is the shadow price of knowledge accumulation. It is possible that
is not concave in the state variable K, in which case the first-order conditions for a
maximum may not be sufficient. In order to avoid this problem I assume that the profit
function is concave in KL, which is equivalent to assuming that the production function Q
doesnot display increasing returns to scale in the variable inputs under the entrepreneur's
control.9 To gain further insight into what restrictions this places on the underlying
TOn p. 47 Teece states that the costs of technology transfer are reduced by "Experience with
tastes, skills, attitudes and knowledge of the infrastructure of the host country". He
provides statistical evidence that transfer costs decrease with the number of transfers.
8We can nevertheless put the average level of knowledge i(inthe denominator of the
training cost term by simply incorporating the number of entrepreneurs into the
denominator of /3.Weshould keep in mind, however, that now the scale of the economy
affects its equilibrium through the channel of the training cost parameter.
91n the presence of convex adjustment costs, the first-order conditions are sufficient for a13
technologies we recall that ll =fl[U(i,K),w,p].We can write H(i,K) =
=Rth(KL/t),where H(1,K/I) h(KJRJ. In order for the profit
function to be concave in K we therefore require that the convexity of II in its first
argument be more than offset by the concavity of h. Assuming this to be true, the
following first-order conditions are sufficient for a maximum to the entrepreneur's
problem:
-— 2(/3/KjI+ (1 + r+j)1.X.1 ￿ 0, with equality if I > 0
(1 + rt,j)1.).t + flKtht =AL
urn fJ(1+ rjAK 0,
t—4u
whereis the derivative of U with respect to its first argument and h is the derivative of
h. If the solution is interior, the first two first—order conditions imply
UKt+lht.I =(1+ rt.t)[7 + 2(fi/KjIJ —['y+ 2(fi/K+1)I.J. (1.2.6)
For simplicity I assume that every entrepreneur begins with the same initial stock of
knowledge K0, so that they all choose identical investment sequences {I}.10 In this case
always equals one and we can drop the time subscript from h.
I now demonstrate that this economy is capable of growing at a constant, positive
rate indefinitely, i. e., that a positive steady state growth rate can exist. Let us suppose
that knowledge is growing at the rate g, so that=i(1+ g) for all t. It can be shown
that the production function (1.2.1) implies that U is homogeneous of degree one in H and
w. It follows thatand I1 are homogeneous of degree zero in ccandw, treating h as a
constant. From the labor market clearing condition (1.2.2) we then have the result that
maximum even if there are constant returns to scale in the variable inputs under the
entrepreneur's control, leading to a profit function that is linear in K.
'°Even if entrepreneurs begin with different initial stocks of knowledge, I conjecture that the
concavity of each firm's profit function in its own knowledge will cause all firms to
converge after some time to the same K, after which time investment sequenceswill be
identical. Indeed, in the absence of adjustment costs and nonnegativity constraints on
investment it can be shown that this convergence will occur in just one penod.14
the wage rate must grow at the same rate as i. Therefore w/i x is constant along this
hypothetical steady state growth path. Turning to the entrepreneur's first-order condition
(1.2.6), we see that in a steady state we can rewrite the left-hand side as HK(h,x,p,E)h,
while the right-hand side equals r(7 + 2fig). Since all arguments ofare Constant along
a steady state growth path, if Consumption is also growing at a constant rate than r is
constant from (1.2.3) and a steady state growth equilibrium is possible. To check this,
note first that the lack of international financial flows requires balanced trade in every
period t:
-C=7771 +77(fl/)(I)2 -fl,
where fl, denotes the derivative of the profit function with respect to the price of the
intermediate good. The left-hand side of this expression gives the value of exports of the
numeraire good and the right-hand side gives the value of imports from abroad. Using the
fact that production is constant returns to scale in E, L, and M, we substitute





which simply states that in equilibrium expenditure on the consumption good exhausts net
cash flow of entrepreneurs and wages of workers. We can rewrite (1.2.7) as
C =i77[fl(h,x,p,E)-'g-
13(g)2-xIlj, (1.2.8)
so it is clear that consumption also grows at the same rate as 1alongour hypothetical
steady state path.
I now show that any steady state growth rate g is unique, and that g> 0 for some
parameter values. First note that in the steady state we can write (1.2.3) as
g =[5(1+ r)]" —1. (1.2.9)





Figure 1: The steady state growth rate is uniquely determined
Second, we can rewrite the steady state entrepreneurial first order condition as
g =[flKO,x,p,E)h/r-y]/2fi. (1.2.10)
Since, as we have already seen, x is uniquely determined by (1.2.2), it is clear that the
curve determined by (1.2.10) is unambiguously downward-sloping in Figure 1. Moreover,
we can shift this curve up (down) arbitrarily by decreasing (increasing) y, holding all other
parameters constant. Thus depending on the parameters of the economy either a unique,
positive steady state growth rate exists or no steady state growth is possible. Note that in
either case a unique interest rate and wage per unit of knowledge are also determined, as
is a unique level of consumption per unit of knowledge denoted by z and determined by
z =i7[fl(h,x,p,E)-- /3(g)2-xfl,J.
With the aid of Figure 1 we can demonstrate that the steady state growth rate in
my model shows the same responses to changes in the efficiency of new knowledge
acquisition as in the model of the previous subsection. It is clear from equation (1.1.7) that
the steady state growth rate in the model of section 1.1 increases with either learning
'In order for a solution to the entrepreneur's maximization problem to exist, it must be the
case that g* < r, where the asterisk denotes the unique steady state value. From equation
(1.2.9) this implies S < (1 + r*)I, so the intertemporal elasticity of substitution cannotbe
too much greater than one.
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coefficient p. Similarly, we can prove:
PROPOSITION 1.2.1: A decrease in the licensing fee or a decrease in the cost of
training /3 increases gt. Proof A lower 7 shifts up the downward-sloping curve in Figure
1 and a lower /3 rotates this curve up about its intersection with the horizontal axis.
My model also displays the now-standard response of the steady state growth rate to
savings behavior:
PROPOSITION 1.2.1: A decrease in the rate of time discounting increases g. Proof A
higher S shifts up the upward-sloping curve in Figure 1.
I leave it to the reader to demonstrate that taxation of income from savings reduces the
steady state growth rate, as in Rebelo (1991).
There are two new features of my growth mechanism. The first is the positive effect
on the steady state growth rate of increasing the size of the labor force while holding the
number of entrepreneurs constant:
PROPOSITION 1.2.3: An increase in the size of the labor force L increases g. Proof An
increase in L decreases the wage rate per unit of knowledge x that solves (1.2.2) and
thereby increases profitability, shifting up the downward-sloping curve in Figure 1.
The second new feature is the effect of the commodity terms of trade on the steady state
rate of growth:
PROPOSITION 1.2.4: An improvement in the terms of trade, reflected in a fall in the
price of the imported intermediate good p, increases g*. Proof A fall in p increases
profitability and shifts up the downward-sloping curve in Figure 1.
Suppose that a large share of the price of the imported intermediate good p is
transportation cost. Proposition 1.2.4 then suggests the possibility of increasing steady
state growth by substituting for these imports. This possibility sheds light on a conflict
among development economists over the benefits of "backward linkages". These benefits
were emphasized by writers such as Baldwin (1963), who were extrapolating from the
growth experience of less developed countries during the late nineteenth and early17
twentieth centuries when transportation costs (especially for raw materials) were much
higher than at present. Writing about Taiwan in the 1960s, on the other hand, Riedel
(1976) states) "it might be argued that Taiwan has been so successful precisely because its
industrial structure lacks backward linkages" (p. 320).Evenin the high transportation
cost case, however, one must be careful before concluding that import substitution will
raise the steady state growth rate. Suppose that temporary protection were imposed in
order to establish a domestic intermediate goods sector, and that in true llirschmanian
fashion the demand for import substitutes thus created called forth its own supply of
entrepreneurs, leading to establishment of a balanced growth steady state at which all
domestic demand for intermediate good output is met at a price lower than the import
price inclusive of transportation costs. 12Thisclearly "successful" case of import
substitution does not necessarily raise the steady state growth rate. The reason is that the
competing demand for labor thus established tends to raise the wage rate per unit of
knowledge. In the case where QandF are Cobb-Douglas, it is easy to construct numerical
examples where establishment of backward linkages through successful import substitution
raises gt and numerical examples where the opposite occurs.
2. Tradeables as the engine of growth
I now introduce the second, "following" productive sector into my model. Its
output is not traded internationally, for example due to high transportation costs or to
government-imposed barriers to trade. For this reason the relative price or terms of trade
between its output and the output of the traded goods sector is determined endogenously.
Aside from the fact that its output is nontraded, the behavioral assumptions for the second
sector are the same as for the first. Two additional important assumptions concerning
intersectoral behavior mentioned in the introduction to this paper are necessary, however.
'2For a full investigation of the properties of this steady state see Rauch (1992).18
First, the managerial talents of entrepreneurs are entirely sector-specificso that no
intersectoral mobility of entrepreneurs in response to differential rents ispossible. Second,
stocks of knowledge are also entirely sector-specific, so that nospillovers of knowledge
between sectors take place. These assumptions lead naturally to identificationof the two
sectors with agriculture and industry, but could also be suitable forapplication to two
regions, where not only geographic distance but also cultural and even linguisticdifferences
hamper intersectoral mobility of entrepreneurs and information.
2.1 Steady state growth
We saw in the previous section that reductions in thecost of knowledge acquisition
(decreases inor fi) in the traded goods sector increased the steady-stategrowth rate of
the economy. If in fact the traded goods sector "drives"regional growth, this should not be
true for the nontraded goods sector. Instead, decreases in theseparameters for
nontradeables should have only level effects,reducing the cost of nontraded goods to
consumers in the steady state.
Denote the traded and nontraded sectors bya superscript T and N, respectively. In
addition to the growth rate, interestrate, and wage per unit of (sector T) knowledge, two
new variables must now be determined in thesteady state: the terms of trade between the
nontraded and traded sectors p and the ratio ofknowledge stocks RT/IN k. The two
additional equations are the optimal investmentdecision for sector N entrepreneurs and the
market clearing equation for sector Noutput.
To keep matters simple I drop the intermediategood from my model. In the
absence of these inputs, we write eachsector's firm-level production function as
Qi =H(f(J,Ki)Fi(Ei,Li),j =T,N. (2.1.1)
It is then easily shown thatwe obtain the profit functions JIT(HT,w) and IIN(pHN,w),
where the constantarguments E have been suppressed to save notation. We see that the
role played by the intersectoraj termsof trade is similar to the role played by the
international terms of trade in theone-sector model of section 1.2: there an increase in p19
reduced profits in the traded goods sector, while here it increases profits in the nontraded
goods sector that is competing with the traded goods sector for scarce resources.
Since there are only two variable arguments in each of the profit functions, to avoid
confusion with the one-sector model I denote the derivatives with respect to each of these




where x is the wage per unit of sector T knowledge.
Consumers can now choose to allocate their consumption expenditure to either T or
N output. We therefore change the consumer objective function in section 1.2 to
[U(cT,c)]1/(1-), > 0, 0 < 5< 1,
to￿t<a,
where U(c,c) is linear homogeneous. This linear homogeneity implies that the marginal
utilities aU/f and ôU/Oc are functions only of the ratio c'/cT, which in turn implies
from the first-order condition (OU/&)/(ôU/ôc'') =Ptthat c/c'' is a function only of
the price ratio Pt• We can therefore write U(cT,c) =c'v(p),and the Euler equation for
consumption of the traded good becomes
(cT./c)° =[v(pt)/v(pt.j)Ja[(5U/acT+j)/( OU/ocT)]5(1+ r.j).
Again we can aggregate this first-order condition without regard to distribution of wealth,
yielding a new version of equation (1.2.3):
(C'',jC'f)° = + r+). (2.1.3)
We can find the optimal investment policy for an entrepreneur in each sector
following the same procedure as in section 1.2. We obtain a new version of equation (1.2.6)
for each sector:
=(1+ rt,t)[7T + 2(9T/T)1T] -[7T+ 2(flT/fC''.1)1T+J
fl+1h,1p+1 =(1+ rt+t)[7N + 2(/R)I] —[7N+ 2(flN/41)J41].(2.1.4)20
Finally, we add the condition that the market for nontraded output must clear in
every period. We note that CN ,lNfl?HN and CT/CN =A(p),A' > 0. Balanced trade
yields CT =,7T[QT-7T1T-(fiT/T)(JT)2]-N[7NJN+ (/3/1)(1N)1• We can combine
these three equations with the fact that QT 11T -wrI'H''HT to get the market
clearing equation
-7T1T-(fiT/T)(1T)1-N[7NJN+ (flN/N)(jN)2J =A(p),I1HN.
In the steady state p is constant so (2.1.3) reduces to (1.2.9), giving us the same
upward-sloping curve in Figure 1 as in the one-sector model. For the traded goods sector
(2.1.4) reduces to the equivalent of (1.2.10):
T TT T g =[fl1(h,x)h/r-y . (2.1.5)
In the one-sector model x was determined by the labor-market clearing equation (1.2.2)
alone. The labor-market clearing equation (2.1.2), however, involves the new variablesp
and k. To solve for the steady state, therefore, we need the steady-state entrepreneurial
first-order condition for sector N, which we obtain from (2.1.4):
g =[flj(phN,kx)phN/r-
7N1129N (2.1.6)
where we have used the fact that along a balanced growth path we haveg =1T1T=
1N1NWe also need the market clearing equation for sector N output, which when we
divide both sides by RN can be written:
??TkEHT(hTX)hT -7Tg-flTg2]-,N[7Ng+ flNg =A(p),fl(phN,kx)hN.(2.1.7)
Determination of the steady state is summarized in Table 1.
I would like to show that the latter four equations in Table 1 determinea
downward-sloping curve in Figure 1, thus demonstrating uniqueness of the steady state
growth rate g* in the same manner as in the one-sector model of the previous section. It
proves simpler to analyze whether an increase in g causes a decrease in r rather than vice
versa. In section A2 of the Appendix it is shown that the direct effect ofg on r through the
optimal investment decisions is indeed negative, under the sufficient but far fromnecessary
condition that A(p) -A'(p)p>0. (This condition is satisfied, for example, if21
Table 1: Steady State Growth
consumption Euler equation:
g =[5(1+ r)J1 -1.
optimal investment decision, traded goods:
g =[rI''(hT,x)hT/r7T]/2T•




nontraded goods market clearing:
Tk[flT(hTx)hT -- f3Tg-,[71g+ fiNg =A(p),rI(phN,kx)hN.
U(cT,c) is a CES function with elasticity of substitution1.) However, there is an
indirect effect of g on r through the nontraded goods market clearing condition that is
positive under the same sufficient condition. Intuitively, the positive indirect effect results
from the fact that a larger g means less current consumption expenditure, causing a fall in
sector N output that reduces labor demand and the wage per unit of sector T knowledge
and thereby increases profitability. Under the assumption that the direct effect dominates
the indirect effect,'3 I prove the following Propositions in section A2 of the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 2.1.1: An increase in the size of the labor force L increases g* under the
sufficient condition that A(p) -A'(p)p￿ 0.
'3The downward slope in r, g space of the curve determined by the latter four equations in
Table 1 is a stronger condition than is needed to establish uniqueness of the steady state
growth rate or to establish the Propositions below. However, maintaining this assumption
allows the reader to see the parallels between the complete model and the model of section
1.2 and conserves on space by eliminating the need to give the specific weaker sufficient
conditions as I state each Proposition.22
PROPOSITION 2.1.2: An increase in the cost of knowledge acquisition yT decreases g*
under the sufficient conditions that A(p) -A'(p)p￿ 0 and r ￿ ghT/hT. Since restrictions
that imply r > g have already been assumed (see footnote 11), the latter condition is
satisfied if hT ￿ hT, which holds if, for example, the function 11T is Cobb-Douglas.
PROPOSITION 2.1.3: An increase in the cost of training T decreases g* under the
suffident conditions that A(p) -A(p)p￿ 0 and r ghT/2hT.
Propositions 2.1.2-2.1.3 correspond to Proposition 1.1 in section 1.2, and are
consistent with the idea that the traded goods sector is the "engine of growth". The results
are different when we turn to sector N.
PROPOSITION 2.1.4: An increase in the cost of knowledge acquisition 7N increases g* if
U(c',c) is Cobb-Douglas. This effect approaches zero asapproaches zero.
PROPOSITION 2.1.5: An increase in the cost of training decreases g* if U(c',c) is
Cobb-Douglas. This effect approaches zero as 1N approaches zero.
Propositions 2.1.4-2.1.5 show that changes in the cost of licensing knowledge for the
"lagging" sector perversely affect steady state growth, and changes in steady state growth
caused by either sector N knowledge acquisition parameter can be made arbitrarily small
by shrinking the size of the other parameter. We can see the underlying reason for this
property of my model by looking at Table 1 and observing that the only way in which
sector N can influence g* is by changing x*, the steady statewage per unit of sector T
knowledge.
Unlike their effects on steady state growth, the effects of the sector N knowledge
acquisition parameters on p should be robust. Consider a decrease in 7N orThis
reduction in the cost of knowledge acquisition relative to sector Trequires a decrease in the
profitability of knowledge acquisition relative to sector T in order to maintain balanced
growth, and this decrease in relative profitability is most directly accomplished by moving
the terms of trade against sector N. In order to do thecomparative static exercises needed
to verify this level effect intuition, I first need to establish that p is unique. Conditions23
have already been given under which the balanced growth rate g* and interest rate r*are
unique. In section A2 of the Appendix I prove that pt, k*, and x are all uniquely
determined given g* and r* under the sufficient condition A(p) -A'(p)p0. It is then
easy to also prove:
PROPOSITION 2.1.6: An increase in the cost of knowledge acquisition 7N (training)
increases p if U(c',c) is Cobb-Douglas and fiN (7N) equals zero.
Under the same conditions given for Proposition 2.1.6 it iseasy to show that k* also
increases with rN or'4 The intuition is that the increase inor 13N temporarily
depresses knowledge growth in sector N, causing k* to rise until the increase in p restores
balanced growth.
2.2 Nontradeables: Pulled along or falling behind?
Since the model of section 2.1 yields exponential growth, we must normalize onone
of the knowledge stocks to obtain a stationary model whose stability wecan analyze. In
the normalized model there is only one state variable, the knowledge stock ratio k, but two
control variables, the normalized investments of each sector. Unlike in the model of
section 1.1, a mathematically formal determination of whethermy model is globally stable
given any set of parameters has not proved feasible. While it is in fact possible to obtain
some analytical results concerning local stability for certain special cases, it proves more
illuminating to combine an intuitive approach to the questions of interest with some
supporting simulations suggested by the model of section 1.1.
We saw in section 2.1 that, when g* and rt are uniquely determined under weaker
conditions so are the steady state knowledge stock ratio k* and the steady state terms of
trade p* Suppose that at some point in time k> k*. If the balanced growth path is
14Jf these conditions were eliminated while retaining the conditions for uniqueness, the effect
of an increase inor fiN ()jpwould be determined by the ratio of two 5 x 5
determinants. The determinant in the denominator would be positive, while the
determinant in the numerator would contain only one negative term, similar to the
"indirect effect" above. This term would have to be dominated for the determinant to be
positive. Details are available from the author on request.24
stable, sector T will "pull along" sector N by bidding up its terms of trade sufficiently
above p to cause it to acquire knowledge at a faster rate than does sector T. If the
balanced growth path is unstable, this terms of trade effect is too weak and sector N falls
further and further behind sector T in rate of knowledge acquisition, losing the competition
for labor and capital resources. The analogy to the model of section 1.1 is clear: there an
initial knowledge stock ratio greater than its balanced growth steady state value also yields
terms of trade for the lagging sector above their steady state value, which causes it to
acquire knowledge at a faster rate than the leading sector if the elasticity of substitution in
consumption is sufficiently small (less than unity).
This analogy suggests that the value of the elasticity of substitution in consumption
will be the key determinant of whether the balanced growth path inmy model is stable. I
now try to see if this insight is borne out by simulations. In particular, I assign to
U(cT,cN) the CES functional form used in equation (1.1.3) above and consider what
happens to stability as I vary the elasticity of substitution c. Turning to the nontraded
goods market clearing equation in Table 1 above, it is easily shown that the function A(p)
associated with this CES specification is {[(1_Q)/0]}E•If0 =.5and the other parameters
of the model are such that p =1,then one can see from Table 1 that it is possible to vary
without changing the balanced growth steady state. This is what I do inFigure 2, which
shows the results of simulations that all start with a knowledge stock ratio tenpercent
above the balanced growth steady state value but have different values ofc. As expected,
the rate of convergence to the steady state declines with.Fore >3.5,the model becomes
locally unstable. Different initial percentage deriations of the knowledge stock ratio or
different underlying model parameters yield qualitatively similar results.
Analysis of why e>> 1was required to generate instability in my model proves
helpful in understanding how the balanced growthprocess operates. In the model of
section 1.1 the variable affecting relative rates of knowledge acquisition is labor force
shares, while in my model it is relative profitability. Substituting K/K for p/p in the25
last line of equation (1.1.5), we see that labor force shares are unaffected by a change in the
knowledge stock ratio if =1,and move inversely (directly) with the knowledge stock
ratio if < 1 (>1), leading to stability (instability). In my model, however, one can
make a heuristic argument that relative profitability will be unaffected by a change in the
knowledge stock ratio only for some > 1. Suppose we disturb the steady state depicted in
Table 1 by a unanticipated ten percent increase in k. Holding g constant, this requires
adjustments in p and x to clear the nontraded goods and labor markets. Ignoring the term
N[yNg + fiNg in the nontraded goods market clearing equation, we can see that forc =1
a ten percent increase in p and a constant x will dear both markets. Profitability of
investment in the traded goods sector is then unchanged, but we can see that profitability
of investment in the nontraded goods sector increases. Unchanged relative profitability
thus requires a percentage increase in p less than that in k, implying c > 1 in order to clear
the nontraded goods market. Inclusion of the term i[yNg + g2] only strengthens this
argument. Thus we see from Figure 2 that, as increases from unity towards its
"break-even" level, the percentage increase in p drops from about equal to about half the
percentage increase in k.
Figure 3 gives an example of the balanced growth process at work. It is suggested
by the experience of the Punjab cited in the introduction to this paper, where extension
services brought Green Revolution technology to the agricultural sector, stimulating its
growth which in turn stimulated industrial growth. An unanticipated fall in training costs
causes the rate of investment in the traded goods sector to accelerate above its previous
steady state level. The terms of trade for sector N are bid up, "pulling along" investment
there and allowing its rate of growth to catch up to that of sector T, thereby establishing a
new steady state at which growth in both sectors is permanently higher.
3. Liberalization and unbalanced growth, with an application to Chile
Suppose that sector N output is not traded internationally due to26
government-imposed barriers to trade. We saw in the model of section 1.1 that
(generically) trade liberalization put the economy on a higher steady state growth path. I
begin this section by showing that the same is true in my model, and then go on to
simulate its transition dynamics (nonexistent in the model of section 1.1) and apply this
simulation to the Chilean economy after 1973.
I suppose that after liberalization the intersectoral terms of trade are fixed at p by
world markets. In section Al of the Appendix I prove that if a positive balanced growth
rate is feasible, then given any p" the balanced growth rate g**, interest rate r**, wage
per unit of sector T knowledge x1, and ratio of sector T to sector N knowledge k** are all
uniquely determined. In other words, for any p there exists a unique solution to the first
four equations in Table 1 (the market clearing equation for nontraded goods is no longer
relevant), provided g** >0.As discussed in the introduction to this paper, in the absence
of the terms of trade adjustment mechanism this steady state should be globally unstable,
by which I mean that given any initial Ick** the economy will diverge still further from
k**. A heuristic argument for this instability runs as follows. Suppose that at some point
in time Ic >k**.(The argument is symmetric if k <k**.)This "head start" for sector T
implies that the wage per unit of knowledge in sector T relative to sector N is lower than in
the steady state, making the profitability of investment in sector T relative to sector N
higher than in the steady state. Since the rate of knowledge acquisition in the two sectors
is equal in the steady state, knowledge growth in sector T is now relatively higher, causing
k to increase still further. An analytical proof that the balanced growth steady state is
globally unstable when the intersectoral terms of trade are fixed is given in Rauch (1992)
forthecasefiT=flo.
Suppose that our country is on the balanced growth path of the model of section 2.1,
and then policy makers decide to remove the protection given sector N, causing the27
domestic terms of trade to fall from p to the exogenously given world level p**.15 The
following Proposition is proven in section Al of the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 3.1: The balanced growth steady state knowledge stock ratio k** varies
directly with the exogenously given terms of trade
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that the knowledge stock ratio k* for the country prior to
liberalization will be above the k** associated with the post-liberalization terms of trade,
so after liberalization the country finds itself in a situation where sector T has more
knowledge relative to sector N than balanced growth would warrant. Following the
argument of the preceding paragraph, the country now embarks on an unbalanced growth
path where k increases without limit. Along this divergent path wages are rising since
investment in sector T is positive. Nevertheless since k is increasing we can see from the
labor-market clearing condition that x, the wage per unit of sector T knowledge, falls
steadily, increasing the profitability of knowledge acquisition in sector T and the share of
the labor force that it employs. Thus investment and production in the economy
ultimately become completely specialized in sector T.
I can now state
PROPOSITION 3.2: Liberalization raises the steady state growth rate. Proof We saw in
section 2. 1 that sector N only influences the steady state growth rate through its effect on
x, the wage rate per unit of sector T knowledge. Since its demand for labor in the labor
market clearing equation of Table 1 goes to zero in the new steady state, the value of x in
the new steady state is dearly less than x and thus the new steady state growth rate is
greater than g*.
The shift from the balanced growth steady state to a one sector steady state is in essence
equivalent to an increase in L in the model of section 1.2, and thus Proposition 3.2 actually
I5Jf p4 were below ptt the output of sector N would be exported, contradicting the
assumption that its output is nontraded. In the knife-edge case pt =pttthe country
remains on the balanced growth path.28
follows from Proposition 1.2.3.
Although the new steady state will be the same, the unbalanced growth path
following liberalization may be very different depending on the relative sizes of the two
sectors along the balanced growth path. Suppose, for example, that sector N was by far
the larger sector, perhaps by virtue of a much greater weight in consumer demand. Since
the two sectors were growing at the same proportionate rate, sector N was accounting for
the buJk of aggregate investment. When its entrepreneurs reduce or cease their knowledge
acquisition, the stimulus provided to investment in sector T by lower expected wages per
unit of sector T knowledge may not be sufficient (because of convex training costs) to
prevent a fall in the overall growth rate of the economy. Eventually, however, because
sector N is now shrinking relative to sector T, the accelerated growth of the latter must
dominate overall per capita income growth so that the unbalanced growth rate becomes
higher than the balanced growth rate. In sum, depending on the parameters of the
economy, "liberalization" may cause an immediate acceleration of growth, a brief growth
"recession", or a prolonged growth "depression" before the ultimate higher growth rate is
attained.
I shall argue below that it is useful to view the Chilean economy after l73 as being
on an unbalanced growth path following a liberalization, with agriculture and
manufacturing playing the roles of sectors T and N, respectively. I focus on Chile because
it is currently viewed by many policy makers from Latin America to Eastern Europe as a
model for economic restructuring. I stick to this case study rather than looking at
liberalization experiences more broadly because the Chilean trade liberalization was
atypically dear-cut. According to Edwards and Edwards (1987), "Between 1974 and 1979
Chile was transformed from a highly closedeconomy, where international transactions were
severely repressed, into an open economy whose foreign trade corresponded quite dosely to
the neoclassical ideal [p. 109]."
Since Chileans speak of the period 1974-1984 as a "lost decade" of economic growth,29
it is interesting to explore whether liberalization is in fact capable of generating a
prolonged growth slowdown in my model starting from a balanced growth path that at
least superficially mimics the pre-liberalization Chilean economy. I thus choose simulation
parameters that yield a steady state balanced growth rate gt of two percent (roughly the
Chilean average for 1950-1973),aratio of sector T to sector N output along the balanced
growth path of one-quarter (roughly equal to the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing
output in Chile in 1973), and a new steady state growth rate (in an economy specialized in
sector T) of 4 percent (close to the Chilean average for 1984—1991). To facilitate
simulation I adopt Cobb-Douglas functional forms for F and H and a CES functional
form with c =.5for U. Parameters are chosen to make sector T production more
labor-intensive than sector N production in line with the realities of agricultural and
manufacturing production in Chile, but otherwise no additional attempts at verisimilitude
are made in choosing parameters. Two concessions are made to the solution powers of the
simulation program. 1) Agents are not allowed to anticipate the liberalization decision.
This permits us to treat the balanced growth knowledge stock ratio k* as a given initial
condition, which results from entrepreneurial decisions in the previous period that turned
out to be incorrect ex post. 2) The relative price of sector N output falls sufficiently to
make it optimal for sector N entrepreneurs to cease all knowledge acquisition immediately,
so that their investment is set to zero. In the simulation reported in Figure 4, p'4' is 18
percent lower than the balanced growth steady state value p*.
Figure 4 shows that the growth rate of GDP initially falls to one percent from the
balanced growth rate of two percent. Essentially, this result occurs because the fall in the
wage rate and interest rate due to decreased sector N labor and investment demand,
respectively, cause the sector T growth rate to jump immediately almost to its new steady
state level of four percent. Since the share of sector T in GDP immediately jumps from 20
percent to over 23 percent as a result of the relative price change alone (i.e., not counting
labor force reallocation), a one percent growth rate for total GDP follows. 15 years are30
required for the growth rate to return to its balanced growth level of two percent.
While Figure 4 would appear to depict a "painIu.l" process of transition to a higher
steady state growth rate, in fact welfare as measured by Ej(.95)tlog(U) is higher at
every rwithliberalization than without. The reason is that liberalization causes a fall in
the price of sector N output, which by assumption is the good on which consumers spend
most of their income.16 As Figure 5 shows, only after ten years has slower growth relative
to a hypothetical continuation of balanced growth dissipated the initial increase in U that
results from liberalization. The following discussion of the Chilean experience with
liberalization will suggest ways in which a more realistic unbalanced growth model could
capture the welfare losses that appear to have taken place during Chile's transition period.
Chile is a country rich in natural resources that experienced a long period of
primary-product export-led growth during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The Great Depression led to a collapse in the world prices of primary products
and was a powerful stimulus to import-substituting industrialization in Chile and
throughout Latin America. After World War II Chile, like virtually all other Latin
American countries, adopted a policy of government-led import-substituting
industrialization. In particular this meant prohibitive trade barriers to manufactured
imports, though many other incentives for industrial investment were offered such as
subsidized credit. This policy led to the creation of a highly diversified but inefficient
manufacturing sector that could not compete in international markets. Per capita GDP
during the period 1950-1973 grew at an average annual rate of about 2 percent (see Figure
6), slightly higher or lower depending on the data source. In late 1973 a new regime came
to power and began a sweeping program of economic liberalization. After a sharp
contraction in 1975, a boom that carried per capita GDP to a new peak in 1981 was
followed by another sharp contraction in 1982-3. By 1984per capita GDP was essentially
'No tariff revenue was lost as a result of liberalization because the tariff is prohibitive along
the balanced growth path by assumption.31
back at its 1973 level (itself already down from the peak in 1971), hence the phrase "lost
decade" of economic growth. Since 1984, however, per capita GDP has grown at an
accelerating rate, with an annual average over the period 1984-1991 above four percent.
While most observers perceive the end of the boom after 1981 as caused by
avoidable macroeconomic mismanagement (Edwards and Edwards 1987 is typical), I want
to argue that the "lost decade" of economic growth was the natural outcome of a transition
from balanced growth to unbalanced growth, the latter being led by agriculture and
agro-processing industry. This larger picture was masked by the 1976-1981 boom, which
appears to have been the result of a speculative bubble in finance and urban real estate.17
The macroeconomic mismanagement story correctly captures the jagged ups and downs
shown in Figure 6 for per capita GDP during the period 1973-1984, but misses the
connection between the medium to long term growth performance of the economy and the
underlying structural transformation that began in 1973. It is partly the perception that
this transformation has "taken root" that leads observers to see the current boom, unlike
that during 1976-81, as sustainable.
In support of my reinterpretation of Chilean economic performance after 1973 I offer
the evidence of Figures 7, 8, and 9. These figures show, respectively, that after 1973 there
was: 1) a complete reversal of the historically declining trend in the ratio of agricultural to
manufacturing GDP; 2) an explosion of agricultural exports and manufacturing imports,
and 3) a rising import penetration ratio in manufacturing after one removes
agro-processing industries, much of the output of which would be classified as agricultural
if the Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) was used. The trends predicted by
the unbalanced growth model, obscured by the 1981 peak in demand for manufactures
(both domestic and imported), are brought out by the estimated time trends included in
'7Morandé (1992) reports that an index of the real price of housing in Santiago more than
quadrupled from early 1976 to early 1981, then fell to its earlier level. Real stock pnces
experienced a similar boom and bust.32
the Figures. Clearly, however, there are ways in which the data do not fit the stylized
story I am telling, which bring out several limitations in the ability of my simple model to
describe the real world. First, we note that during the period through 1973 that I identify
with balanced growth, Chile was a net importer of the products of agriculture, the sector I
identify with sector T. The true source of foreign exchange for the Chilean economy was
copper mining, not agriculture. The copper mining sector does not fit into the framework
of my model because wide swings in the world price of copper dominate any productivity
changes due to accumulation of knowledge and because its extremely low labor intensity
minimizes the importance of its labor market interactions with other sectors.18 Second, a
related point is that the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing production is in secular
decline through 1973, while of course this ratio should be constant along a balanced growth
path. This reflects not only government intervention on behalf of manufacturing over and
above protection, but also the operation of Engel's law as incomes rose while (as shown in
Figure 8) the Chilean agricultural and manufacturing sectors remained virtually closed to
international trade. Third, and most important, the model of unbalanced growth implies
that after liberalization the manufacturing sector will ultimately disappear completely.
The limitation of the model revealed by this undoubtedly false prediction flows from the
fact that all entrepreneurs/firms within a sector are identical, so if one ceases to invest and
ultimately goes out of business so must all the others.
One more key feature of the Chilean liberalization experience that is left out by my
market clearing model is the tremendous increase in unemployment that occurred: the
unemployment rate averaged 4.5 percent during the period 1966-1972 but never dropped
below 10 percent during the 1976-1981 "boom".19 This probably accounts for the fact that
'81n 1973 the ratios of mining employment to manufacturing employent and agricultural
employment were 16.9 and 15.4 percent respectively (data supplied by Joseph Grunwald
from computations by Esteban Jadresic.
t9The sources for the unemployment data are Economic and Social Indicators and various
issues of the Mont hl Bulletin of the Central Bank of Chile.33
Chile did not merely experience a growth slowdown but an actual growth stoppage during
the period 1974-1984. This suggests that it is the assumption of costless movement of
labor between sectors that prevents my unbalanced growth model from capturing the
"painfulness" of the Chilean liberalization experience.
4. The effects of economic integration
Consider two countries or regions with separate labor markets. The two countries
or regions may be specialized in production of different goods which they trade with the
rest of the world (induding each other) at given world prices, or they may produce the
same good but be unable to exchange entrepreneurs and information due to geographic
distance or cultural and linguistic differences. Each country or region is on its own steady
state growth path as described by the model of section 1.2 (omitting the intermediate
good).
Now suppose the two countries or regions unite to become one country with free
internal labor mobility. If the new country adopts a policy of free trade, so that the
relative price of the regional outputs remains unchanged compared to the pre-integration
situation, then (as noted in the previous section) we know that there exists a unique
associated with this pt that yields balanced growth. (If the two regions produce the same
good then p is identically one, and if their knowledge acquisition technologies arc also the
same it is easily shown that k** equals one as well.) I also argued in section 3 that this
balanced growth steady state is globally unstable. Thus we expect that under free trade
one region will go into relative decline in the sense that its entrepreneurs will become
progressively poorer relative to those in the other region and will employ a monotonically
decreasing share of the new country's labor force. This implies continual emigration from
the declining region even in the case where the two regions produce different goods if
entrepreneurs in the booming region find that they need to continue to locate their
production there in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers in their industry.34
Which region will ultimately dominate the integrated economy? To avoid
introducing new notation for the knowledge stock ratio and the terms of trade we label the
regions T and N. We can then say that region T (N) will dominate if the knowledge stock
ratio k at the time of integration is greater (less) than k**. It obviously follows that region
jismore likely to dominate the greater isat the time of integration. Since we already
saw in Proposition 3.1 that k** increases with p", a region is also more likely to dominate
the higher is the relative price of its output on world markets. Intuitively, a greater
knowledge stock or better terms of trade both act to raise the absolute wage rate of a
region, so that economic integration makes investment by that region's entrepreneurs more
profitable when it causes the new wage rate to settle in between the two old ones. By a
straightforward modification of the proof of Proposition 3.1 in the Appendix, the reader
can show that k** increases (decreases) withand T (N and jr),fromwhich it can be
deduced that a region is more likely to dominate the easier is its acquisition of knowledge.
Again the intuition for this result runs through greater profitability of investment. While
the possible asymmetry between the production functions for the outputs of the two regions
prevents us from proving a Proposition, I have established a presumption that if, at the
time of economic integration, one region has a wage rate and growth rate greater than or
equal to those of the other region (with one strict inequality), that region's entrepreneurs
will ultimately employ the entire labor force of the integrated economy. It is easy to
construct examples where the region with the higher wage rate but lower growth rate or
vice versa will not dominate, simply by manipulating the ratio of the region's labor force
endowment to its entrepreneurial endowment. This ratio affects the absolute wage rate
and the growth rate in opposite directions, but it becomes irrelevant to relative
profitability after economic integration.
In the steady state the new country must grow faster than the region that came to
dominate the economy did in isolation: economic integration has simply provided this
region with a source of cheap labor, lowering the wage rate per unit of knowledge and35
thereby increasing profitability and the growth rate. It is nevertheless theoretically
possible that this growth rate is lower than was the growth rate in isolation of the region
that declined. Let us set aside this case and suppose that in its steady state the new
country grows faster than did either of its component regions in isolation. Following the
analysis of liberalization in the previous section, immediately after economic integration
the new country may nevertheless grow slower than did either region in isolation if, for
example, the declining region was sufficiently larger than the booming region. Also as in
the case of liberalization, the welfare effect of any initial slower growth due to economic
integration may be more than offset by an initial efficiency gain, which now results from
the integration of two previously separate labor markets.
If it is the case that the two regions are specialized in producing different goods,
suppose that the quantity supplied of the output of the region that would decline under free
trade is smaller than the quantity demanded by the new country at the initial world price
ratio. It is then possible for a policy such as a common external tariff to allow the relative
price of that output to rise above the world price sufficiently to permit convergence to the
balanced growth path described in Table 1. How will the steady state growth rate compare
to the growth rates of the two regions in isolation? This is unclear since there need not be
any cheap labor effect: from the point of view of either region both labor supply and
competing labor demand are being added by economic integration. In fact, I have
constructed numerical examples where the new steady state growth rate is in between the
old regional growth rates, where it is above both old growth rates, and where it is below
both old growth rates. Of course we do know that the new country must grow slower along
the balanced growth path than it would have if it had been allowed to specialize in the
output of the region that would have dominated under free trade. It therefore appears that
in the choice between free trade, yielding an unbalanced growth path, and protection,
yielding a balanced growth path, the new country must trade off regional equity against
not only static but also dynamic efficiency.36
It is interesting to view the much-studied problems of the South of Italy in light of
the discussion in this section. It is generally agreed that per capita output was lower in the
South than in the North of Italy when the country was unified in 1861. At that time the
tariffs between the various Italian states were eliminated and low Piedmontese external
tariffs were substituted for the much higher external tariffs of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies (the South). In line with the discussion above, let us think of the North and South
of Italy in 1861 as two regions that produce the same good but are unable to exchange
entrepreneurs and information. Given the initial difference in per capita output and the
closer proximity of the North to Northwest Europe, the source of the most advanced
technological knowledge at the time (effectively giving the North a superior knowledge
acquisition technology), it is reasonable to assume that the ratio of the Northern to
Southern knowledge stock exceeded k** at the time of Unification. My model then predicts
that a process of unbalanced growth should have begun, with continual migration of the
Southern labor force to the North and decline in Southern per capita income relative to the
North. These events did indeed take place, but there is considerable debate over their
timing. The censes of 1861, 1881, and 1901 show a faster rise in industrial employment in
the South than in the North up to 1881, followed by a sharp fall in Southern industrial
employment versus a continued increase in the North. King (1985, pp. 35-37) believes a
relative decline in Southern industrial employment began immediately but was masked by
a "rogue" census in 1881. Allen and MacLennan (1970, pp. 37-38) argue that the Southern
economy was relatively isolated until the mid—1880s, when the new State's program of
bringing the Southern road and railway network up to Northern standards began to bear
fruit, after which time the regional product and labor markets were more integrated and
the Southern decline began. But in any case, no significant decline in relative Southern
income was measured until after 1901, simply because neither region registered significant
per capita income growth before then. From 1901 to 1951, however, several different
statistical sources all support the occurrence of a more or less monotonic decline in relative37
Southern income.20 According to Allen and MacLennan (1970,p.40) virtually the entire
increase in Italy's agricultural output between 1900 and 1940 occurred in the North, and
industrial employment declined by about 10 percent between 1901 and 1936 in the South
but grew by roughly 50 percent in the North.
Since 1950, massive government transfers from the North to the South have allowed
the latter to keep pace with or even catch up slightly to the former in terms of per capita
GDP (OECD 1990, p. 70). Migration from the South to the North was nevertheless about
two million between 1951 and 1961 and again between 1961 and 1971, 600,000 between
1971 and 1981 and 100,000 between 1982 and 1988 (OECD 1990, p. 76, n. 38). The clear
slowdown in migration does not appear to reflect greater employment generation in the
South since the Southern unemployment rate rose to over 20 percent in 1988, more than
three times the level in the North (OECD 1990, p. 71). Modernization and growth has
definitely taken place in the South since 1950, but Northern entrepreneurs have been the
agents of this progress according to the literature surveyed by King (1987, pp. 19 1-192).
This indicates a gradual overcoming of the barriers of geographic distance, culture and
language that originally prevented the interregional mobility of entrepreneurs and
information, so that in terms of the discussion of this section the movement of the Italian
economy towards a steady state where Northern entrepreneurs employ the entire labor
force need not imply the emptying of the South in the long run.
5. Summary and conclusions: Application to the transition in Eastern Europe?
In this paper a mechanism of endogenous growth suitable for investigation of
sectoral or regional interaction was developed. It was shown how the high value placed on
production linkages by economic historians might be reconciled with the high value placed
on openness (often implying lack of linkages) by observers of contemporary less developed
20See the sources cited in OECD (1990, p. 64, n. 24) and Allen and MacLennan (1970, p. 39,
n. 1).38
countries. When the output of one sector is traded and the output of the other is
nontraded, it was shown how the traded goods sector acts as the "engine of growth" in the
sense that its profitability of knowledge acquisition primarily determines the steady state
aggregate growth rate. It was also shown how sectors or regions interact out of steady
state through product, labor, and capital markets, and in particular how if the former
interaction dominates the growth of one sector "pulls along" the growth of the other while
if the latter two interactions dominate one sector or region booms while the other declines.
The paper built on these results to show why liberalization of foreign trade should lead to a
transition from a lower to a higher steady state growth rate and why, during the course of
this transition, growth might initially be even slower than before liberalization. A final
application to economic integration of previously separate regions or countries showed that
the largest growth effects are to be had if one region is allowed to decline and provide a
source of cheap labor for the other region.
One way in which the theory developed in this paper could be profitably extended is
by developing the spatial implications of the balanced growth model in the case where
transportation costs cause the output of sector N to be nontraded. The spatial boundary of
tradeability could be determined endogenously, thereby defining a region within the
country. If this region is growing faster than the rest of the country a spatial
agglomeration at the regional level could result that is reminiscent of that described by
Krugman (1991) but is driven by a leading, technologically progressive industry as in
Perroux (1955).
A more speculative extension of the theory developed in this paper would be
application of the unbalanced growth model to the transition from state socialism to
capitalism. McMillan and Naughton (1992) argue that the immediate acceleration of
growth that followed reform in China compared to the depression that accompanied the
transition in much of Eastern Europe indicates the advantage of "evolutionary" over
"big-bang" reform. They point to three key factors in China's reform success (p. 131):39
"first, massive entry of non-state firms; second, a dramatic increase in competition, both
among state firms and between state firms and non-state firms; and, third, improvements
in the performance of state-owned firms resulting from state-imposed market-like
incentives." Let us interpret sectors T and N in section 3 above as the non-state sector
and state enterprise sector, respectively. Entrepreneurs in the non—state sector acquire
knowledge in order to better meet the needs of the market while "entrepreneurs"
(manager-bureaucrats) in the state sector acquire knowledge in order to better meet the
needs of the state plan. In a "big-bang" liberalization further acquisition of the latter type
of knowledge is useless and the incumbent managers of state enterprises are unqualified to
acquire the former type of knowledge, hence investment on the part of state enterprises
dries up. Since the state sector is by far the larger sector initially, growth plummets and
could even turn negative if we allowed for costly movement of labor between the state and
non-state sectors. With an evolutionary liberalization of the type undertaken by China, on
the other hand, the state plan is gradually adjusted to become more "market-like" and
state enterprise managers either learn how to respond to the new incentives or are replaced
by people who are able to learn how, and in the limit they are not at a disadvantage
relative to non-state sector entrepreneurs with regard to further knowledge acquisition and
investment. State enterprises and non-state enterprises can then be viewed simply as firms
of different size within a unified economy, and there is no reason for investment to collapse
in either "sector". In short, the evolutionary reform policies followed by China work to
maintain investment by state enterprises, which is necessary to avoid a transitional
depression because the state sector is initially so much larger than the non-state sector.40
APPENDIX
AO. Assumptions on second derivatives of the profit functions derived in section 2
Throughout this Appendix we will need assumptions on the second derivatives of
our profit functions that are stronger than the restrictions implied by the convexity
property we get from standard microeconomic theory. For example, convexity tells us that
the second derivative with respect to the price of output is nonnegative, so that output
supply functions are not downward-sloping, but we need to assume that output supply
functions are strictly upward-sloping, implying that this second derivative is positive. All
of the assumptions made here are satisfied if, for example, the underlying production
functions are Cobb-Douglas, as they are in all of the simulations conducted in the text.
ASSUMPTION AO.1: flJ1> 0, j= T,N.
This is true if and only if the supply functions are upward-sloping.
ASSUMPTION A0.2: fl2>0,j= T,N.
This is true if and only if the input demand functions are downward-sloping.
ASSUMPTION AO.3: [P12 (=fl)<0, j= T,N.
This is true if and only if a marginal increase in knowledge increases input demand, or
equivalently if and only if an increase in input price reduces the marginal profit from an
additional unit of knowledge.
Al. Uniqueness and comparative statics with exogenous teruis of trade
Proof of uniqueness. I first demonstrate uniqueness of g** and r** by showing that
Figure 1 applies, i.e., that the two entrepreneurial first-order conditions and the
labor-market clearing condition yield g varying inversely with r. We totally differentiate
the appropriate equations from Table 1 to obtain41
2;3T_fl'l2hT dg _(7T+2fiTg)
2flXrrI7hkp**I13hKxp** dx=yN+2flJgdr
077TT2 + ,7flk,lMflx dk 0
Using the assumptions in section A0 the reader can easily show that the determinant of the
left-hand matrix is positive. Substituting the right-hand column for the first column of
this matrix, we obtain a new matrix whose determinant is easily shown to be negative.
From Cramer's rule, it follows that dg/dr < 0 and Figure 1 applies. I next show that given
the unique g** and rt, a uniqueand k** are determined. This follows if and only if
the equation
fl''(hT,x)hT/(7T + 2/3Tg**) =ll(p**hN,kx)hNp**/(7N+ 2/?g**) (Al)
and the labor market clearing equation have a unique solution. A sufficient condition for
uniqueness of this solution is that all principal submatrices of the associated Jacobian
matrix have positive determinants (see Gale and Nikaido, 1965). Totally differentiating
with respect to k and x yields the Jacobian
Ji =_fl2hNxp*/(yN÷2Ig**)UThT/(7T+2IJTg**) -jj1 2hNkp**/(7N+2flNg**)
iifl22x 77'22+ 77 [122k
Thediagonalterms of Ji are positive and itis easily shownthat its determinant is as well.
Proofof Propos1tion 3.1. Total differentiation of the first four equations in Table 1
yields
I-a
{(1÷r)61a-l 0 0 dr 0
7T2Tg 2Trfl2hT 0 dg= 0 dp
_(lM+2:3Ng)-2?r fl2hNkp [II2hKpx dx _(flhN+fl1h?Phro)
0 0 77TnT+77Kflki7fl2xdk _17N[J 1hN42
Using the assumptions in section AO the reader can easily show that the determinant of the
left-hand matrix is positive. Substituting the right-hand column for the fourth column of
this matrix, we obtain a new matrix whose determinant is unambiguously positive provided
thatn2kfl1hNphN -fl2hNkpifI1hN￿ 0. But it follows from homogeneity of
degree one of fli in its two arguments that 11lt'12 - = 0.From Cramer's rule, we
therefore have dk/dp > 0.
A2. Uniqueness and comparative statics with endogenous terms of trade
Conditions for uniqueness of the steady state growth rate and interest rate. Total
differentiation of the last four equations in Table 1 yields
TT T T
7+2/3g 0 -fl12h 0 dr
_(7N÷2flNg)flhN+U1hNphNrI2hNkp ll2hNpx dp NN N TT NN NN
o f121h 17 [122+17 1122k i fl22x dx




Using the assumptions in Section A0, the last equation in Table 1, and the facts
[1211112 - = 0,fl1phN + flkx =0,it is straightforward to verify that the
determinant i of the left-hand matrix is positive if A(p) -A'(p)p>0. Substituting the
right-hand column for the first column of this matrix, we obtain a new matrix whose
determinant is equal to _2fiTr1j -2LINrA21 where
is the (i,j) minor of the original matrix. Using the same information as before, it is
easy to show that H and 21 are positive if A(p) -A'(p)p>0, butis negative. It43
follows that the direct effect of g on r through the optimal investment decision, equal to
(_23Trii -2/1Nr2i)/&is negative, arid that the indirect effect of g on r through the
nontraded goods market clearing condition, equal to
_[17Tk(7T+2flTg)+17N(7N+2flNg)]4j, is positive. If the direct effect dominates the
indirect effect, an increase in g will cause a decrease in r, and the latter four equations in
Table 1 determine a downward-sloping curve in Figure 1, proving the uniqueness of the
steady state growth rate and interest rate.
Proofs of Propositions 2.1.1-2.1.5: I again totally differentiate the last four












The assumption that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect of g on r implies that
the determinant of the left-hand matrix is positive. Therefore, to prove Propositions
2.1.1-2.1.5 all we need to do is substitute the appropriate column of the right-hand matrix
for the first column of the left-hand matrix and examine the sign of the determinant of the
new matrix.
Proposition 2.1.1: Substituting the first column of the right-hand matrix, the determinant
of the new matrix is -Afl,whereis the (i,j) minor of the original left-hand matrix.








Fo-r-2rg 0 0 1
_I0 0 0 r2rgf
I_i 0 0 0 0 I
NN 2'






Proposition 2.1.2: Substituting the second column of the right-hand matrix, the
determinant of the new matrix is -r11 -iTkg41,Using fl2fl1 -I11I12=0again,
simple algebraic manipulation leads to the conclusion that -r11 -llTkg4iis negative if
A(p) -A(p)p￿ 0 and r ￿ ghT/hT.
Proposition 2.1.3: Substituting the third column of the right-hand matrix, the
determinant of the new matrix is -2rgL11 -,lTk(g)24iLet =2rgand =(g)2.By the
proof of Proposition 2.1.2, we know that the determinant is negative if A(p) -A'(p)p￿ 0
and ? ￿ hT/hT, or 2rg ￿ (g)2hTIhT or r ￿ ghT/2hT.
Proposition 2.1.4: Substituting the fourth column of the right-hand matrix, the
determinant of the new matrix is -th21 -igi41.Using the last equation in Table 1 and
fl1phN + fl2kx= 0again, this determinant reduces to
-(r/p)[yNg+(g)} in the case where U(c'',c') is
Cobb-Douglas so that A(p) -A(p)p=0.Using the third equation in Table ito simplify
this expression yields _fl2hT(1N)2flxrfiN(g)2/p, which is positive under the assumptions
in Section A0 and approaches zero as fiN approaches zero.
Proposition 2.1.5: Substituting the fifth column of the right-hand matrix and following the
same manipulations as in the proof of Proposition 2.1.4 thereafter reduces the resulting
determinant to _fl2hTfl x{hNlll(g)2 - in the case where
U(ci',c) is Cobb-Douglas. Again, using the third equation in Table 1 to simplify this
expression yields fl2hT()2flxr7N(g)2/p, which is negative under the assumptions in
Section A0 and approaches zero as yN approaches zero.
Proof that p. k*, and z* are all tzniqizely determined given g and r# lhnder the
sufficient condition A(p) -A'(p)p ￿ 0. This follows if and only if the equation
fl(phN,kx)hNp(7T + 2fiTg*) -rI'(hT,x)hT(lN+ 2?g*) =0 (Al')
and the labor market and nontraded goods market clearing equations have a unique
solution. Totally differentiating with respect to p, x, and k yields the Jacobian45
(IlNhN+lIJ 1hph) _fl2hT(7J2g*) fI 2hpx(,yT+2fiTg*)
(7T+2flTg*)+112hJkp(7T+2/9Tg*)
NN N TT It It NJ J2= 17fl21h 771122+17fl22k 77fl22x
-A(p)77flh 11T77ThTk 17T(nhT_7Tg*_flTg*2)
-A(p)ifl1(hK)2-A(p),l12hk-A(p)ifl 2h
The diagonal terms of J2 are positive. Simple algebra shows that the determinants of the
lower right-hand and upper left-hand principal submatrices are also positive. The
determinant of the principal submatrix formed by deleting the second row and second
column of J2 is easily shown to be positive if A(p) -A'(p)p￿ 0. Finally, the determinant
of J2 can be shown to be positive if A(p) -A'(p)p￿ 0 by repeated use of the fact
NNN N . " -1''22=0and by using equation (Al') and the last equation in Table 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.6. I will write out the proof for the increase in .The
proof for the increase in fiN is qualitatively identical. First note that under the
assumptions that U(cT,c) is Cobb-Douglas and fiNequalszero, g is unchanged by an
increase in 7NbyProposition 2.1.4. It follows that r* is also unchanged so we can do the
comparative static analysis using only equation (Al') and the last two equations in Table
1. Total differentiation yields J21flNQ [dp dx dk} =[nT/iTo 17Ng*JdyN. The
determinant of J2 fiN0canbe shown to be positive using the proof of uniqueness
immediately above. To complete the proof we then need only to substitute [U 'hT 0 ,jfor
the first column of J2N and examine the sign of the determinant of the new matrix.
This can be shown to be positive using simple algebra.
Note that since g* is unchanged, x is fixed by the second equation in Table 1. It is then
clear from the last equation in Table 1 that k* must increase to offset the increase in p'
andor46
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 Notes to Figures 6 -9
Figure 6:
Percapita GDP for 1960-1991 was computed using data for GDP in 1977 Chilean
pesos from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
based on official data, and population data from version 5 of the Penn World
Tables. Per capita GDP for 1950-1959 was computed by extrapolating backwards
from 1960 using the per capita GDP growth rates implied by version 5 of the Penn
World Tables.
Figure 7:
Source:ECLAC, based on official data.
Figure 8:
AgricultureincludesStandard International Trade Classification (SITC) Sections 0,
1,2, 4 less Divisions 27 and 28. Manufacturing includes SITC Sections 5-8 less
Division 68. Sources are United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
various years, and ECLAC, Data Bank on Latin American and Caribbean Foreign
Trade (BADECEL).
Figure 9:
Solid line shows manufacturing defined by International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) Section 300 less 372 (Non-Ferrous Metals). Dotted line shows
manufacturing defined by ISIC 300 less 372, 311 (Food Products), 313 (Beverages),
314 (Tobacco), and 331 (Wood Products, Except Furniture). Source: Joint
ECLAC/UNIDO Industry and Technology Division.